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Abstract
Recent experimental results with humans involved in social dilemma games suggest that coop-
eration may be a contagious phenomenon and that the selection pressure operating on evolu-
tionary dynamics (i.e., mimicry) is relatively weak. I propose an evolutionary dynamics model
that links these experimental findings and evolution of cooperation. By assuming a small frac-
tion of (imperfect) zealous cooperators, I show that a large fraction of cooperation emerges
in evolutionary dynamics of social dilemma games. Even if defection is more lucrative than
cooperation for most individuals, they often mimic cooperation of fellows unless the selection
pressure is very strong. Then, zealous cooperators can transform the population to be even
fully cooperative under standard evolutionary dynamics.
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Humans often behave cooperatively in social dilemma situations in which withholding co-
operative behavior is logically better. In fact, cooperation in social dilemma games has been
explained by various mechanisms including kin selection, assortative interactions, group com-
petition, direct reciprocity (i.e., repeated interactions), reputation-based indirect reciprocity,
and spatial or network structure of populations [1, 2].
In contrast, recent evidence suggests that cooperation at a population level may occur as
cascading in a social network [3]. Such a contagious view of cooperation is distinct from the
mechanisms governing cooperation explained above, which assume that individuals at least
try to maximize material payoffs, a central assumption in game theory including evolutionary
game theory. In contagion, individuals may imitate others’ behavior without much caring the
material payoff to the self and others.
The comtemporary results of the so-called upstream reciprocity (also called generalized ex-
change and pay-it-forward reciprocity; it is a type of indirect reciprocity) are also consistent
with contagious scenarios of cooperation. Upstream reciprocity, in which an individual helped
by somebody helps somebody else, is widely observed in humans [4–8]. However, theory assum-
ing payoff maximization does not support upstream reciprocity on its own [9,10]. Cooperation
on the basis of upstream reciprocity is stable only in combination with a different mechanism
such as direct reciprocity [11], mobility of players across groups [12], assortative interaction [13],
sufficiently frequent ingroup interaction [14], and network reciprocity [11, 15, 16].
Contagion of suboptimal behavior or attitudes seems to be even more common outside
social dilemma games. Even if individuals do not like the behavior or social norm (e.g., binge
drinking in colleges) and are not forced to adopt it, they often obey others. In sociology, such
a phenomenon is interpreted under the framework of herd behavior, pluralistic ignorance, and
false enforcement [17, 18].
Contagion implies that individuals change behavior under null or weak selection pressure.
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Consistent with this, the selection pressure for humans playing the prisoner’s dilemma game
was recently shown to be relatively weak; subjects did not take the imitate-the-best behavior
with a probability of ≈ 30% [19] (also see [20]).
Nevertheless, even under weak selection pressure, unconditional defection remains the unique
Nash equilibrium of the social dilemma game. Then, how can we explain cascades of coopera-
tion found in experiments?
In mimicry-guided opinion formation models in which the two competing opinions are
equally strong, a small number of zealot voters can attract nonzealous players to the pre-
ferred opinion of the zealot [21–25]. Motivated by these studies, I show that a small fraction of
zealous cooperators can reliably induce cooperation at a population level. It should be noted
that opinion formation models and (social dilemma) games are fundamentally different in that
only the latter involves strategic interactions and natural selection. Examples of situations in
which zealous cooperators in social dilemmas are witnessed include military services and team
sports [26], and perhaps charity campaigns. In the proposed mechanism, weak selection pro-
motes cooperation. However, the selection pressure does not have to be as weak as assumed in
other theories of cooperation (e.g., [27, 28]). The proposed mechanism does not require addi-
tional model components such as the conformity bias [29,30] or so-called cooperation facilitators
that increment payoffs to cooperators, but not to defectors [31].
Results
I analyze the evolutionary dynamics given by Eqs. (8) and (9). I mainly examine the prisoner’s
dilemma game described by a standard payoff matrix given by R = 1, T > 1, and S = P = 0.
When zealous players are absent (i.e., y = 0), D is the only Nash equilibrium (i.e., xC = 0). I
explore the possibility that cooperation is stabilized among ordinary players in the presence of
zealous players.
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Prisoners’ dilemma with perfect zealous cooperators
In this section, I consider the case in which the zealous players always cooperate (i.e., p = 1,
yC = y). In this case, Eq. (8) is reduced to
dxC
dt
=
1− xC
〈pi〉
{
(1− w)y + w
(xC + y)(xC + y − TxC)
1 + y
}
. (1)
Because the coefficient of x2
C
in f(xC) ≡ (1−w)y+w(xC+ y)(xC+ y−TxC)/(1+ y) is negative
and f(0) = (1 − w)y + wy2/(1 + y) > 0, the dynamics has at most one internal equilibrium,
which is stable if it exists. When f(1) > 0, i.e.,
T ≤ 1 +
y
w
, (2)
dxC/dt > 0 (0 ≤ xC < 1) holds true such that the only equilibrium is located at x
∗
C
= 1.
Then, all the players eventually cooperate. Equation (2) indicates that weak selection and the
presence of many zealous players facilitate such full cooperation. If T > 1 + y/w, the stable
equilibrium x∗
C
is given by
x∗
C
=
−wy(T − 2) +
√
w2y2(T − 2)2 + 4w(T − 1)y(y + 1− w)
2w(T − 1)
. (3)
It should be noted that 0 < x∗
C
< 1.
The equilibrium fraction of cooperators among the ordinary players is shown as a function
of y and T in the case of relatively weak (w = 0.1) and strong (w = 1) selection in Figs. 1(a)
and 1(b), respectively. The lines represent T = 1+y/w and separate the full cooperation phase
and the partial cooperation phase. Figure 1 indicates that the fraction of cooperators is mainly
determined by y/w and is larger with the weak selection than the strong selection.
Prisoner’s dilemma with imperfect zealous cooperators
In fact, zealous players may not perfectly cooperate. Therefore, I investigate evolutionary
dynamics given by Eqs. (8) and (9) with p < 1 by numerically integrating them. I use the
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Euler-Maruyama integration scheme with dt = 0.01. For a fixed set of parameter values, I
started the evolutionary dynamics from various initial conditions, i.e., (xC, yC) = (0.05i, 0.05j),
where i and j are integers and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 19, and confirmed that the equilibrium is independent
of the initial condition.
The equilibrium fraction of cooperators among the ordinary players is shown for (w, T ) =
(0.1, 1.5), (0.1, 2.5), (1, 1.5), and (1, 2.5) in Figs. 2(a) 2(b), 2(c), 2(d), respectively. When
w = 0.1, nearly perfect cooperation is obtained unless the fraction of zealous players (i.e., y)
and the probability that zealous players unconditionally cooperate (i.e., p) are both small. This
is also the case when the temptation payoff T is rather large (Fig. 2(b); T = 2.5). Even when
w = 1, a considerable amount of cooperation (e.g., 0.4) is observed for a wide parameter range
when T = 1.5 (Fig. 2(c)).
To confirm that the results are not specific to the Moran type of the reproduction process,
I also implemented the so-called pairwise comparison rule (Methods) [27, 32–34]. In short, in
the pairwise comparison rule, the probability of the strategy replacement is a sigmoid function
of the difference between the fitness of two randomly selected players. This update rule is
implicated in recent laboratory experiments [19]. Numerical results for the prisoner’s dilemma
game with T = 1.5 and T = 2.5 under the pairwise comparison rule with β = 0.5 are shown
in Figs. 3(a) and 3(b), respectively. The results are qualitatively the same as those under the
Moran process (Fig. 2). In the rest of the present paper, I use the Moran process.
The fraction of cooperators among the ordinary players for various values of T is shown in
Fig. 4. I used two large values of p (p = 0.9 and p = 1) and two small values of y (y = 0.05
and y = 0.1). Under both weak selection (Fig. 4(a); w = 0.1) and strong selection (Fig. 4(b);
w = 1), the results do not depend much on the value of p for large p. This behavior is also
evident in Fig. 2. Therefore, the theoretical results obtained in the previous section for the
case of perfectly cooperating zealous players (i.e., p = 1) are translated to the case of imperfect
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zealots (i.e., p < 1) without much change. In contrast, the fraction of cooperation is sensitive
to the density of zealots (i.e., y).
Snowdrift game
The emergence of cooperation owing to the combination of ordinary players and zealots is not
restricted to the case of the prisoner’s dilemma. In this section, I briefly examine the snowdrift
game, also known as the chicken game and the hawk-dove game [35–37]. The payoff matrix
of a standard snowdrift game is given by R = β − 0.5, T = β, S = β − 1, and P = 0, where
β > 1 [37]. I set β = 1.5 such that the stable fraction of C in the absence of zealots is given by
(2β − 2)/(2β − 1) = 0.5.
The fraction of cooperation among the ordinary players is shown for w = 0.1 and w = 1 in
Figs. 5(a) and 5(b), respectively. Figure 5 indicates that the fraction of cooperators is much
larger than 0.5 in a wide parameter range, particularly when w = 0.1.
Discussion
I showed that a small fraction of zealous cooperators can guide cooperation of players that obey
a standard evolutionary dynamics. The numerical results indicate that the zealous players do
not have to be perfectly zealous cooperators. The proposed mechanism operates better when
the selection pressure is weak and the density of zealous players is large. Although I used the
Moran process and the replicator dynamics, the results do not qualitatively change if a different
strategy update rule called the pairwise comparison rule is used.
All the present results are independent of the initial condition. Therefore, if the dynamics
is initiated from a small density of cooperation, perhaps only among zealots, cooperation can
cascade to prevail in the population. I emphasize that the cascade can occur even if most
players prefer defection to cooperation to some extent. My results may provide theoretical
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underpinning of cascades of cooperation [3] and upstream reciprocity [4–8] observed in human
subjects. In contrast, the emergence and maintenance of cooperation based on conformity
bias [29] requires that a majority of players initially cooperates.
Crucial assumptions underlying the proposed explanation of cooperation are the stochas-
ticity of the dynamics and weak selection (i.e., small w). Weak selection is often employed in
theoretical studies because, among other things, Taylor expansion on w often leads to analytical
conditions for cooperation (e.g., [27, 28]). However, experiments with human subjects present
evidence against excessively weak selection [19]. I referred to the intensity of selection equal
to w = 0.1 as weak selection. This value of w may not be too small to violate the reality.
In general, the effective intensity of selection depends on the payoff matrix and the strategy
update rule as well on the w value. Nevertheless, the following simple calculus may help: the
largest and smallest possible fitness values in the prisoner’s dilemma used in this study are
equal to 1−w+wT and 1−w, respectively. Therefore, w = 0.1 indicates that the ratio of the
two fitness values for T = 2, for example, is equal to (1−w+wT )/(1−w) = 11/9. If this ratio
should exceed 2, w > 1/3 is required under T = 2. Although I only examined the extreme two
cases, i.e., w = 0.1 and w = 1, the results shown in the figures imply that much cooperation
will be observed with w = 1/3. In fact, some cooperation is observed even with w = 1 if proper
conditions are met (Figs. 1(b) and 2(c)).
It should be noted that I assumed that players, either ordinary or zealous, have the same
strength of influence on others. Although the heterogeneity in the influence of individuals, i.e.,
power, would shape collective behavior of humans, the present contribution is not about the
power but about the relationship between zealots, weak selection, contagion, and cooperation.
I did not ask the origin of zealous cooperators. Trivially, they will not emerge as a result
of evolution unless other games or dynamics are simultaneously considered. One interpretation
of this assumption is that zealous players are not interested in maximizing the material payoff.
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Zealous cooperators are found in some real situations [26]. Another interpretation is that
zealots are payoff maximizers but have different payoff functions. In theory of collective action,
heterogeneity in interests and resources of individuals are suggested to elicit collective action
to solve the free rider problem (see [38] for a review). Although the present mechanism is
independent of that of collective action, zealots may perceive payoffs differently from ordinary
players such that cooperation may not incur social dilemma for zealots.
Methods
Model
I consider evolutionary dynamics of an infinite well-mixed population in which each pair of
players is involved in the symmetric two-player two-strategy game once per generation. The
payoff matrix is defined by


C D
C R S
D T P

, (4)
where the entries of Eq. (4) represent the payoffs that the row player gains. Each row (column)
corresponds to the action of the row (column) player, i.e., cooperation (C) or defection (D).
I assume two types of players. A player of the first type, called ordinary player, obeys a
standard evolutionary dynamics described below. A player of the second type, called zealous
player, may obey the evolutionary dynamics or unconditionally cooperate.
The evolutionary dynamics is defined as follows. The summation of the payoff over all
the opponents defines the aggregated payoff to a player. The fitness, i.e., the propensity to
reproduce, of a player is a linear function of the payoff. The proportionality constant controls
the intensity of selection. At the end of each generation, a single player whose strategy (i.e.,
C or D) is replaced is selected with the equal probability from the population. If the selected
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player is ordinary player, a parent, which is either ordinary or zealous player, is selected from
the entire population with the probability proportional to the fitness. Then, the strategy of
the updated player is replaced by that of the parent player. This update process is equivalent
to the Moran process, a standard model of the birth-death process (e.g., [2]). If the updated
player is zealous player, its strategy turns to C with probability p. With probability 1− p, the
updated player obeys the rule used by the ordinary player to adopt the strategy of a parent
selected with the probability proportional to the fitness.
I normalize the density of the ordinary players to unity and denote the added density of
zealous players by y(≥ 0). The densities of cooperators among the ordinary and zealous players
are denoted by xC (0 ≤ xC ≤ 1) and yC (0 ≤ yC ≤ y), respectively. The mean fitness, with the
divisive factor 1 + y (i.e., the total population density) intentionally neglected, is defined by
〈pi〉 ≡ (xC + yC)piC + (1− xC + y − yC)piD, (5)
where
piC = 1− w +
w [(xC + yC)R + (1− xC + y − yC)S]
1 + y
(6)
and
piD = 1− w +
w [(xC + yC)T + (1− xC + y − yC)P ]
1 + y
(7)
are the fitness to a C and D player, respectively, and w (0 ≤ w ≤ 1) indicates the intensity
of selection [27, 28]. Equations (6) and (7) indicate that the payoff to a player per opponent
is translated to the fitness with proportionality constant w. I assume 〈pi〉 > 0 such that the
selection of the parent player with the probability proportional to the fitness is well defined.
In the reproduction phase, a cooperator and defector are selected as parent with probability
(xC + yC)piC/ 〈pi〉 and (1 − xC + y − yC)piD/ 〈pi〉, respectively. Therefore, the dynamics of the
fraction of cooperators among the ordinary players is given by
dxC
dt
=
1
〈pi〉
[(xC + yC)piC(1− xC)− (1− xC + y − yC)piDxC] . (8)
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When y = 0, Eq. (8) is equivalent to the meanfield equation of the Moran process. If the
divisive factor 〈pi〉, which just controls the time scale of the dynamics in this special case, is
neglected, Eq. (8) is reduced to the usual replicator dynamics.
The dynamics of the density of cooperators among the zealous players is given by
dyC
dt
= p(y − yC) +
1− p
〈pi〉
[(xC + yC)piC(y − yC)− (1− xC + y − yC)piDyC] . (9)
When p = 1, zealous players always cooperate (i.e., yC = y). In this case, Eq. (8), with 〈pi〉 in
the denominator neglected, is equivalent to Example 2 given in [39].
Pairwise comparison rule
In the so-called pairwise comparison rule, the probability that the replacement occurs depends
on the difference between the payoffs to two randomly selected players. At the end of each
generation, I randomly select two players from the population without bias. If the two players
are both cooperators or both defectors, nothing takes place. Otherwise, C replaces D with
probability 1/
[
1 + e−β(piC−piD)
]
, and D replaces C with probability 1 − 1/
[
1 + e−β(piC−piD)
]
=
1/
[
1 + e−β(piD−piC)
]
[27, 32–34]. The intensity of selection is controlled by β(≥ 0).
The evolutionary dynamics for the infinite population under the pairwise comparison rule
is represented by
dxC
dt
=
2
1 + y
[
(1− xC)(xC + yC)
1 + e−β(piC−piD)
−
xC(1− xC + y − yC)
1 + e−β(piD−piC)
]
(10)
and
dyC
dt
= p(y − yC) +
2(1− p)
1 + y
[
(y − yC)(xC + yC)
1 + e−β(piC−piD)
−
yC(1− xC + y − yC)
1 + e−β(piD−piC)
]
. (11)
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Figure 1: Fraction of cooperators among the ordinary players in the presence of perfectly zealous
cooperators (i.e., p = 1). The lines represent T = 1 + y/w. I used a typical payoff matrix of
the prisoner’s dilemma game given by R = 1, T > 1, and S = P = 0. I set (a) w = 0.1 and (b)
w = 1.
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Figure 2: Fraction of cooperators among the ordinary players as a function of the additional
density of zealous players (i.e., y) and the probability of unconditional cooperation for zealous
players (i.e., p). I set R = 1 and S = P = 0. (a) w = 0.1, T = 1.5. (b) w = 0.1, T = 2.5. (c)
w = 1, T = 1.5. (d) w = 1, T = 2.5.
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Figure 3: Fraction of cooperators among the ordinary players in the prisoner’s dilemma game
when the pairwise comparison rule is used for the updating. I set R = 1, S = P = 0, and
β = 0.5. (a) T = 1.5. (b) T = 2.5.
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Figure 4: Fraction of cooperators among the ordinary players as a function of the temptation
payoff (i.e., T ). I set R = 1 and S = P = 0. (a) w = 0.1. (b) w = 1.
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Figure 5: Fraction of cooperators among the ordinary players as a function of y and p in the
snowdrift game. I set R = β − 0.5, S = β − 1, T = β, P = 0, and β = 0.5. (a) w = 0.1. (b)
w = 1.
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